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DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY: NATO, THE EUROPEAN





Throughou t th e Cold War, NATO and its Euro pean mem bers had a relation ship in
which their respecti ve tasks were distin ct. NATO was to be respo nsible fo r th e territorial
defense and mili tary integratio n of its members, and the various incarn ations of the current
European Union were to he responsible for the political and economic in tegra tio n of their
members;' W he n th e Cold Wa r ended , th e th reat of a large-scale att ack on th e territory of
a N ATO member state virtually eva po rated , and with it, N ATO's raison d 'clre. Conve rsely,
the EU has been more able to fu rther no nm ilitary integration among its memb ers du e to a
shift in the sec u rity env iro nment from mil itary to eco no m ic and politi cal secur ity, and the
co m bating of cr im e rath e r than the resistance to a possi ble invasio n." W ith secur ity becorn -
ing based less on " hard ," or military po wer, and more on "soft," o r political and econo m ic
power, it app eared that NATO was no lon ger neede d to secure th e N orth Atl anti c area.
When it eve ntu ally became clear that NA T O would remain in ex istence. it became
necess ary to redefine its role in relati on to th e grow ing military capa bilities of the EU, which
we re initially see n as being in co m petition to those of NATO . As new threats on Europe' s
borders flared up , ho wever . NATO was still th e primary sec ur ity acto r as th e EU pro ved
unp rep ared to dea l di rectly w ith the gr owing violence in the Balkans.' Eventua lly, as th e
EU moved to wards th e establishme nt of a Eur opea n Secur ity and Defense Poli cy (ESO P),
it became necessary to establish formal m ilitary relation s w ith NA T O as the mil itary es-
rablishments of most EU members wer e heavily intertwin ed w ith eac h other and w ith the
United States thr ough NATO. This paper will analyze th e NATO-EU military relati onship
after th e C old W ar wi th attention paid to the important issue of differing intcrpreratio ns of
primacy in th e Europ ean security area, and in doing so will address th e com plicated devel-
opment of mil itary agre eme nts betwe en NATO and th e EU. It wi ll furtherm ore present
case stud ies o f the negot iations preceding and co nduct of several post- C old W ar military
operations carr ied o ut by th e EU and their implicati on s o n the N AT O -E U relatio nship.
This paper wil l argue that th ere is a clear tirnelin e in N ATO - EU mi litary relat ion s and
that agreement s betwee n the two organizati o ns reflec t both the changing sec urity realities in
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Europ e and th e improv ing mili tary capabilities of th e E U . While not always perfect, N ATO
and th e EU have created a relati on ship that allo ws them to work independently and along-
side each other w hen and if agreellleJlt on such co o peration can be reached . It appears th at
fo r now, th e E U ret ains the capability to in dep cndcn tly conduc t military o pe rat ions, ho w-
ever lim ited in time and scope, bur at the sam e time is ready, w illing , and able to co nduc t
op era tio ns Il1 close cooperatio n with NATO. The recent pro blems with the developme nt
of the Ai rbus A4 00M long- range mi litary transpo rt aircrafi' are also evid en ce not only of
the EU's military capability sho rtfalls, but also of NATO (and of U nited Stat es) primacy in
mil itary logist ics, w itho ut w hich operatio ns, espec ially those in " o ut- of-area" thea te rs, are
no t possible . NA T O 's relu ctan ce to un derta ke police-type op eratio ns is also ofgreat im po rt .
T hu s, th e EU m ust rely on NATO assets to cond uct large -scale or high-intensi ty ESO P op -
eratio ns; conversely, NAT O m ust rely 011 the EU to conduct m ilitarized law enforcem ent
tasks in are as previously un der N AT O operational cont rol.
II. NATO-EU RELATIONS IN THE 19905'
C o m pared to today, N ATO and th e European Union had little o fficial co nt act
throu gho ut th e 1990s. T he N ATO -E U m ilitary relationship was not a salient topic for
discussion bet ween NA TO and the EU before the end of the Cold W ar as N ATO W ;l S
recognized as th e primary inrcrgovcn uucnra l provider o f Euro pean secur ity . D evelo pments
in mi litary pol icy in the E U after the end of the Cold Wa r began in earne st in 1992, w hen
the Western European Unio n (W E U)," th e W este rn Eu rope-centered sec ur ity organiza-
tion that w ould event ually beco me what amo un ted to th e European U nio n 's military an n ,
agreed o n a set o f capabilities that it sho uld be abl e to «Ill up o n as a Europ ean mutu al de-
feu se organization . T hese capabilities or " tasks" were agreed at ,I meeti ng of tlie WEU at
the Pete rsburg H otel near BOlin, lead ing to th eir nami ng as the " Petersburg T asks." T he
Petersburg T asks include un dert aking human itarian, peacekeeping, and crisis m ana gem ent
missions, bu t no t terr ito rial defens e, whi ch co nt inued to be left up to N AT O . The T asks
were merged into the Treaty of Amste rdam (w hich am ended the EU 's fo un din g tr eaty, the
T reaty of M aastr icht) in 1997 w hich took effec t iJI 1999. T his effec tively merged th e W EU
w ith th e E U .7 H o wever , befor e thi s merger o cc urred , an agreement o n mi litary coo pera-
tion between NATO and th e WEU would be co ncluded, the Com bined J o int T ask Fo rce
framework .
/I.A. THE COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE
T he C ombi ned J oint T ask Force fram ewo rk , or CJ T F, was envision ed as a way and
in the end, allo wed the Alliance to resolve in large part its existential cr isis that had been
o ngoing since the end of the C old War. Its nam e is in reference to a task for ce , or a tern -
pora ry mi litary uni t fo rmed for a spe cific purpose, w hich is mounte d Joi ntly across m ultiple
branches o f a m ilitary (army, navy, air force , e tc .}, and which is made up of a com binatio n
of forces from mu ltiple co untries." Originated by N AT O 's milita ry co m ma nde r, SACEU R.
(Supreme Allied C ommander Europe) U S Ar my G eneral Joh n Shalikashvili," an d offi cially
prop osed in late 199 3 by US Secretary of Defense Les Aspin , the CJTF arra nge m e nt wo uld
allow NATO memb er states to un dertake mi litary op erations, using NATO resources, and
wi tho ut in vol vin g all N AT O mem be rs. T he main idea of the CJ T F was to provide a fo rma l
way for sub sets of NATO m embers to co operate m ilitarily th rou gh NATO in a non- Art icle
5 operatio n, because either th e thea ter of ope ratio ns did not include a NATO mem ber (so
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no Art icle 5 pr o vision s co uld appl y) I " o r be cau se th e Alli an ce as a w hole co u ld not fo rma lly
agr ee o n an und ert akin g, keep in g N AT O fro m act ing at all. J 1
A n exa m ple of probl em s o f this sort f,lced b y NATO in the 19YOs w ere the disagree-
m e nts am o ng the Un ite d State s, the United Ki ngdom , an d France rega rdi ng th e fo rmer Y u-
gos lavia prior to NATO's eventual Intervention in August 1995 in Bosnia . Various p rop os-
als had been put fo rw ard regarding a NATO intervent ion before th is tim e , but iuability to
reach an ngreeme nr o n th e proper method (airstrikes, gro u nd o pe ratio n , etc .) kept any plans
from m o ving forw ard , III addition to "paralyzin g" th e N o rth Atlanti c C o u ncil and severely
ham pering its ability to ca rry o u t the da y-to- day ope ratio ns o f th e Alli anc e."
The pro posal of th e CJT F w as an ackno wl ed gem ent o f several facts: fir st, that NATO's
m ain purpose was 110 longer its o nl y important o ne, th at is, th e co llec tive territorial defense
o f m em be r states. Second, it ackno wled ged th at NATO w as a useful and appro priate bod y
to co nd uct smalle r- scale peacek eeping-typ e o pe ratio ns that m ay no t have in te reste d o r h ad
an im pac t o n all membe rs, and third , th at th ere exis ted no n- state o r int rastat e threats to
transatlantic secur ity. O ne of th e pr obl ems befo re th e crea tio n of the CJ T F, and one that it
was in P~l rt m ean t to solve , is that large parts o f the m ilitar y capab ilit ies o f so m e members
we re always envisio ned to be d raw n from NATO , so paralle l capabilities we re ne ver d e-
ve lo ped or we re not developed to the po int w he re an indi vid ual u iem ber w o uld be able to
ac t full y indep ende nt ly if it so chose (exce pting, o f co urse , th e U nited Sta tes an d to a lesser
ex te nt th e United Kin gdom and Fran ce). It was the case th at if, for ex am ple . so m e Eu ropean
NATO m em bers w ished to undertake a peacekeepi ng o pe rat io n, th er e w as no me chanism
for them to have re course to NATO asset s whic h, if given, w o uld have enabled th em to
un dertake th e ope ratio n . This problem w as exace rba te d b y th e tw o f.lctS that all NATO
m em ber states must agree on any decision to use (o r, in th is e lse, provide for the use of)
force , and th at th ere are NATO m ember state s w ho w ert' no t members of the European
U ni on and were therefo re not cove red by th e defen se capab ilit ies o f the WEU.
The cre atio n of the CJT F represented a m ajor sh ift in Al liance policy which through -
o ut th e Cold W ar had be e n th at N ATO sho uld ac t un ani m o usly o r no t at all. ':' The rem o val
o f the need for un animous All ied actio n (but no t of un anim ou s All ied approval) 111 th e CJTF
framew o rk appeared to create th e possibility th at NAT O asse ts co uld be used by th e W EU
to th e det rim en t o f a NATO member state as the tw o o rga n izatio ns' mem be rship ro lls we re
no t perfectly overlap ping. Th is co nc ern was eve nt ually resol ved in ag reem en ts co nclude d
in the ea rly 2000s, as d escrib ed belo w .
1I.A.l. CJTF Development: Different Directions
It is possible to divid e th e discussion 0 11 the possibility o f <I CJTF framew o rk into three
cam ps: Atla uticists, led by th e U S and the UK, Europcanists, led by Fran ce, and Euroat lan-
ticists, led by G ermany." Arguments put fo rt h in stro ng favo r o f a CJT F fram ew o rk were
state d by AI/anl;eisl countries. They still saw N ATO as th e pri m ary secur ity organ izati o n in
Eu ro pe , and th eir support for th e CJTF wa s view ed b y som e as a "preempti ve stri ke " aga inst
a bu rgeon ing European Security and D efense Identity (ES D J)'S and a more indep en den t
WEU . In their view, <In independ ent ESD I and W EU w o uld violate the principle of "sep a-
rab le bu t not separatc ,"! " a goa l stat ed in the un anim ously-approved declaration released
afte r the 1994 NAT O H eads of State and Governme nt m eeting. This idea intended tha t
th ere sho uld be an indep enden t E uropea n (W E U) capab ility to act m ilitarily, an d th at th ese
capabilit ies co uld include th e use o f N AT O asset s, but that th ey sho uld no t be perm an ently
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separate from capabilities already possessed by NATO. The only W~l Y for that to happen, of
co urse , would hav e been for th e WEU to budd duplicati ve permanent structures for their
ow n use , w hich is exactly what th e Atlantitist states were tryin g to avo id ."
The Europcanist vie w is simple to expla in : the WEU should be able to act co m ple tely
independently without any outside assistanc e o r intervention. This would obvi ou sly requIre
duplication of existing NATO assets and capabilities. Fran ce , a lon gtime critic of th e "orga-
niz.uionul " part of NATO, led thi s view and co nt inued to block progress o n developme nt
of the CJT F until, facing drasti c cuts in defense spend ing at home and am on g o the r WEU
allies, it realized it could no lon ger realistically suppo rt th e development of stru ctures and as-
sets completely separat e from NATO .' 8 Euroatlanticist states were int erested in an ex pansion
of both NATO and WEU cap abiliti es and were initially uncommitted to a single proposal.
The structure of a CJT F was [ Iidy straightforward , but the de velopment of its st ructure
was mired in controversy. In gen eral, offic ers participating in a CJTF would be assigned to
a NATO installati on as part o f a CJT F "nucleus," and would be "dual-hatted ," th at is, th ey
would at once be ser ving as o ffice rs o f th e NATO installation to whi ch the y were assigne d
and as officers in th e CJT F chain of command. !" The political and military cha ins of com-
mand were som e of the most controversial elements of th e CJTF frame wo rk. France for its
part resisted the Am er ican noti on that a CJTF would be ultimately be led by th e SAC E U R,
always an American , and wanted to set up a separate chain of command and polic y bod y
that w ould ove rsee CJT F depl oym ents. The "s epara ble but no t separate" argument wa s
again used by the U S III its opposition to cre ation of n ew politi cal and military command
structu res, which wo uld allow th e US to rem ain inv olved III every decision to usc NATO
resources, eve n if it ultimatel y chose not to participate in the ope ration at all. The U S pro-
posal was to set up co m m ittees with in th e ex isting N orth Atlanti c Council ro ove rsee crisis
managem ent and peacekeeping policy. Tlii s particular disagreement stalled pro gress on th e
CJTF fram ework for ov er two yea rs.:"
Following Fran ce 's de cision to move closer to th e Alliance in mid - J9~5. an agree-
ment on th e CJTF m oved closer to completi on. Eventually, France was th e o nly major
player rem aining III the Europeanist camp, with both th e UK and Ge rm any suppo rting th e
U S visio n of the CJ T F.cI As th e co m pletio n o f th e agree m en t neared, however , Chai rman
of th e J oint C hiefs o f Staff Gen eral John Shalikashv ili o bje cted to the ent ire proposal as he
was co nce rned th at th ere wa s a possibility that Fran ce wo uld, in a CJ T F. direc tly control
operation s involving US forc es. His objecti on s did not sto p the Un ired States from proceed -
ing wi th th e plan '"" Finall y, th e U S made a major co nces sio n to m ove th e ag reem ent to a
co nclusio n: it dropped its insisten ce o n CJ T F com mand being part of th e ex isting integrat ed
military co mm and, that is, it no lon ger insisted th at the SACEUR. would be parr of th e
chain of com mand . It accepted the pos sibility of CJT Fs being co mmande d from nat ion al
military headquart ers. provided they adhered to NATO standards and regulations. This
rem oved the final stum bling blo ck to th e CJ T F agr ee me nt.
In Berlin in J un e l C) ~ 6 , NATO foreign ministe rs signe d a formal agreeme nt o n the
CJTF. This agre em ent would permit th e WEU to use US airlift (as th e U S was th e m ajor
provider of NATO airlift ca pability) , co mm unica t io n, and satellite intelligence capabih-
ties, as we ll as NATO airb orne early warning aircra ft during CJT F mission s. The Alli an ce
would have to unanimously agree on the co nditions of the release of its assets. The phrase
"sepa rable but not separate military capabilities" was part of th e Final Comm un ique of
the Berlin m eeting , sho w ing the influ en ce of th e Atlanticist view on th e agreement. and
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NATO's Assistant Secretary-G eneral for Defen se Plann ing .m d Policy, a ke y m ilit ary cap;l-
bilities planner in the NATO poli tical hierarchy , ad m itted that th e CJ T F frame w o rk w o uld
avo id t he cr eatio n of "unnecessary, separate capab ilit ies" ." Successful exe rcises of the CJT F
system we re ca rried o ut in 1997 and 1SJ l)i\. Whil e the Berli n ag reelll ellt, w h ich would lend
its nam e to th e Liter " Berlin Plu s" series of agree ments. esta blished the m embers' w il ling ness
to pr o vide for CJT F mi ssio ns, arguments abo ut u ltim ate polit ical an d m ilitary co nt ro l ove r
a possibl e CJT F co ntin ued at var ying degrees of int en sity until th e co ncl usio n of th e Be rlin
Plus agr eements In 2002.
As envisioned III th e Jun e 1\)96 Berlin conunnni que, the CJTF frame w o rk had th ree
poss ible o pe ratio n types . First , th ere co uld be a " N AT O -o nl y" CJ T F w it h a subs et of Al-
lian ce m embe rs parti cipatin g and using Alli an ce asse ts. Seco nd , there co uld be a "NAT O -
plu s" CJT F wi th so me Alli an ce members parti cipating alongs ide Partne rship for Peace2 1
states, using Alliance asset s. The cr eation o f a st ruc tur e to allo w uon-NATO co u ntries to
contribute to and co operate militarily with N AT O w as ano ther impo rta n t fun ct ion o f th e
CJTF fram ew ork. Last, th er e co uld be a "WE U-led CJTF" wh er e the WEU wo uld use
,I NATO head qu art ers and Alli an ce assets to co nd uc t its operati on .P This final possibility
wa s th e closest eq uivale nt to what would lat er become th e cent ral point o f the Berlin Pl us
ag reem ents. Fu rt he rmore , this possibility wo uld allo w th e W E U to use US airlift capa-
biliti es as assigne d to NATO , m ateri ally in vol ving the United States w he ther it w ished to
contribute nati onal asset s o r not, beyo nd th ose already assigned to N ATO (such as gro u nd
troops, arm ored vehicles, etc) . D espite the possibility that thi s ar rangeme nt could requ ire a
sign ificant co m m in u en t of resources by th e U n ite d States, it was not see n as a p ro blem. As
a US Ambassador to N AT O put it ,
N o 0 111' has y( '1 thou,l!h l C!( a scenario ill u-uirh tlu: ~VEU I/Iollili ivaut 10 do SO/1'lI'-
111I' lIel! and America 1I'0 1lid opposc it. BUI, [()'o u Europeans do 11'11 11110 bel/TOil ) our
ill11'11 (i!clire , transport or communications ra/laril)' ill NA T O , please ask Oil a case-
by-case basis: the answer is likd)' 10 be "Ycs. )'2(,
This q uote also bri ngs up th e fact that in effect, th e Un ite d States w o uld hav e
multiple reasons to veto a pot ential W EU-Jed CJ T F opera tio n . The US, of co ur se , possesses
a veto ove r an y CJ T F op era tio n, as do all NAT O m embers, hu t th e significan t and uniqu e
commitm ent by the United Sta te s to an y CJTF o perat io n, w he the r o r not it co nt rib uted any
soldiers, o fficers, or other m at er iel, llIay cr eat e add itio nal concerns o n the part of the US . If,
for example, it w as indep endentl y engaged in ano th er military operatio n when a requ est for
a WEU- Ied CJ T F cam e to th e N orth Atl anti c C o u ncil, perhap s it mi ght ha ve autho rized
th e CJTF but fo r its pr eexi stin g need for all o f its airlift capacity to suppo rt its o ngoing in-
d epend ent o pe ratio n.
T his question of th e existe nce of a NATO veto ove r a pote ntial WEU o peratio n
would become far m o re salien t as the military capabilities o f th e WEU (and, ev ent ually ,
th e EU) im p ro ved . This ve to has often bee n de scribed as a " rig ht of fIrSt re fusal ," w h ich ,
if ex iste nt , wo uld requi re th at any W E U o r EU mission be fi rst br ought to NAT O for the
co nside ratio n of a " N AT O -only " o perat ion , w hi ch , if refu sed , co uld th en possibl y co nt in ue
as a \VE U- o r E U - Ied o pera tion w ith possible recourse to NATO asse ts. T his is n ot a " right
o f first refusal." as w o uld become th e ten n o f art in th e co ntext of th e Berlin Plu s arrange-
m ents. T he difference between the peri o d preceding the cre atio n o f th e CJT F m ec han ism
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and following th at. th e period pr eceding the co nclusio n of th e Be rlin Plus agreements, is
th at durin g th e forme r. the capabilities availabl e to th e ESDI were rather limited , Thus there
was no " first" refu sal to be made , ;\ S th e WEU (or EU) W~IS un able to undertake ~lll Y type of
signi ficant peacekeep ing o r cr isis m uuagemen t ope ratio n witho ut NATO assets. It would be
accu rate to des cribe NATO's right, as of the conclusio n of th e CJT F agree men t . as a " rig ht
o f refu sal," sin ce a refusal by NATO to allow access to Allian ce assets w ould effectively
pre vent the WEU from mounting an y operation whatsoeve r. As th e ESDI rransformcd into
th e European Security and D efen se Poli cy, a subpart o f th e Com mon Foreign and Security
Poli cy (C FS P) , and th e EU slowly acquired th e ability to co nd uct independent o pe rn rio ns
without NATO assets, the qu estion of a right o f "first" refu sal become central to the discu s-
sio n of any NATO-EU cooperati on.
II.B. NATO-EU MILITARY RELATIONS POST-CJTF
The successful im plemen tatio n of th e Petersburg Tasks und er th e aegis o f th e EU and
not o f the WE U was only possible after th e co nclusio n of th e 199R Anglo-Fren ch Saint-
M alo sunun it wherein the UK and France agr eed that the "[Eu rop ean] Union mu st have th e
capacity for au ton omous acti on , hac ked up by cred ible military forces, th e m eans to decid e
to USf th em , and a readiness to do so, in o rde r to respond to int erna tio nal crises.'?" This was
a sea cha nge ill th e European positi on o n defen se matters. as disagreements between the UK
an d France had held up significant progrf ss on C FSP since th e creation of th e C FSP pillar
o f th e EU in 1993 with the Treaty of Maastri cht . The United States respond ed in suppo rt of
th e n ew ESOP initi ative, with th e caveats of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's "3 O s:"
no decoupling from NATO, n o d uplica tio n o f ex isting NA T O resources, and no discrimi-
nation against non-EU NATO m embers (most significantly, th e U S, Ca nada, and Turkey)
in EU-NATO cooperative operatio ns . These we re co nd itions that th e U S m aintained until
at least 200X 2 ' NATO acknowledged the Saint -M alo declarat ion at its 1999 W ashin gton
Summit . and stated that it was immediately prepared to offer th e EU "assu red " (permanent)
access to NATO planning capabi lities , but th at it wo uld reser ve decisions o n EU acce ss to
NATO assets (aircraft. intelli gen ce , com m u nica tions, erc .) o n a case- by-case basis2 9
Finally, in late 19')') at th e European C o unci l Sum mi t in Helsinki , th e Counc il de-
cide d upon th e" H elsinki H eadlin e Goal." Th is was a seri es o f military capa bili ty target s to
he reached by 2003 that wer e needed by th e EU to carry o ut the' Petersburg Tasks, which
it had assigne d itself in th e Treaty of Amsterd am. ": The H elsinki Summit also marked th e
turning point in NATO-EU milita ry relati ons [rom the CJT F to wards th e Be rlin Plu s agr ee-
m ents. Pri o r to th e Summit, all military ope ratio ns conduct ed under ESOP we re dep endent
o n the EU 's in stitutional connection to th e WEU, whi ch in turn was potentially dependent
o n borrowed NATO assets w hich could be rev o ked at an y time by a loss o f co nsensus in
the N orth Atlanti c Council ." Following th e H elsinki Sum mit, the EU gradua lly began to
tak e over coope ration with N ATO froiu th e \VEU so th at th e lin k to N ATO assets wen t
di rec tly to th e E U rather th an th rou gh an intermediary o rga nizat io n . This c hange thus di -
rec tly foresh ad o wed the eve ntua l Berlin Plu s ag reeme nts, NATO , for its pa rt, subseque ntly
stated its gen eral agreement with the EU plan s stated at th e Helsinki Sum m it."
At till s point , we ha ve seen that th er e was the political will to have the capability to
undertake military acti on o n th e part of th e European U nio n, and a distinct lack of and
desire for th e capability itself. The development o f ESOP as part o f C FS P co nt inue d into
th e twenty-first ce ntur y with th e appoi ntment of a former NATO Secre tary- Gene ral, J a-
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vier Solana , as th e EU 's H igh R epresent ative fo r C FSP and as th e Sec rctarv- C eue ral of th e
WEU. Mr. Sala m 's uniqu e insight s Into NATO 's o rgan ization . in add itio n to his tenure
as Secreta ry- General dunng the establishm ent of th e CJTF m echan ism, lent credihility and
added efficie n cy to th e EU 's am bitions for coope ratio n with th e Alliance, and NATO,
during the s.uue peri od , undert oo k mi ssion s ill Bosnia and H erzegovina (SFOR) and the
for me r Yu goslav R epubli c of M aced onia (O pera tions Esscntiat Harvest, A tnbe, Fox, and A/-
lied H am loll )'.) As ESDP develop ed , howeve r, cooperatio n bet ween th e NATO and the EU
became hogged down in Allian ce politi cs. T he developme nt of the Berlin Plu s agreeme nts
were not immune to this pr oblem.
III. DIRECT NATO-EU COOPERATION: THE BERLIN PLUS AGREEMENTS
III.A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE AGREEMENTS
The Berlin Plus agreem ents, wh ose nam e refers to th e 1<)96 Be rlin accord that set up
the CJTF m echanism, grew directly out of th e co nclusions of th e 1991) Washin gton Sum-
mit whi ch affin lled NATO 's w illingness to develop a system by which the EU co uld use
Alliance assets. Until th at point, th e EU had reco urse to Allia nce assets onlv throu gh the
WEU, and such recourse was dep endent o n co ntinued un animou s consent am on g NATO
m em bers. The June 19<) <) Cologne European C o uncil m eeti ng established th e EU positi on
on form al arra ngem ents d irec tly between the E U and N ATO: that ce rtai n " capabilities and
common assets" should be "pre-identified" fo r a "presumption of availabili ty " to th e EU,
and access to NATO plann ing capabiliti es sho uld he "assured, " but that th e release of Al-
lian ce asse ts sho uld be ultimately decid ed "o n a case- by-c ase basis." 33 ThIS was a cautio us
position . It did not call for a significant cha nge in the ex isting arrange me nts between the
WE U and NATO, o nly th at NATO should deal directl y wi th the EU rath er than th rou gh
an intermed iary, the W E U . A more .uubitiou s stance on th e part of th e EU , perh aps m o re
In line with the Europcanist view, might have included calls for concre te guarantees of
NATO asset availability o r for a specific list of assets to be " pre-iden tified ." The fact that
the EU did not ad opt such a position, w he n it was well within its rights to do so , shows
its nom inal acquiesce nc e to a m ore A tlanticist view that significant EU assets sho uld not be
separate, noruina llv or o the rw ise, from th ose of NATO . At th is point, howeve r, Alliance
politi cs bega n to slo w do wn th e negotiation s.
In b tl' 1<)<)<), Turkey became concern ed that an E U- o llly forc e w ith recourse to
NATO assets might prejudice its Interests in C ypru s. This was due to the fact that Turkey, a
non -E U N AT O mem ber , had and still has a dispute over th e island of Cyprus with Greece ,
a member of hath NATO and th e E U . .Ii It would seem at first g lance th at th e EU wo uld he
more interested in defen d ing th e int erests o f its o w n members rath er th an th ose of NATO
mem bers opposed to th e interes ts of its mem bers. The situ atio n be cam e significantly more
complicated when th e E U attem pted to co nstruc t milita ry agre eme nts with N ATO, an or-
g.mizario n that operates on COJlSenSllS , and had as one of its members a state th at had serious
disagreem ents with an E U m ember state . It can be concluded , therefore , th at Turkey was
not co ncerne d en ou gh abo ut the CJTF m ech ani sm to veto its im plcrue n tntiou . but that a
d irect link from NATO to the EU, un encumbered by any WEU procedural in vol vement
and with th e pos sibility of o pe ratio nally indep endent EU fo rce s using NATO asset s, would
co nstitute a direct threat to its national int erests. The Tu rk ish pos itio n would co nt inue to
imp ede' discussions of furth er cooperation between the EU and NATO until ve ry close to
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th e conclusion of th e Berlin Plu s agreem en ts.
Littl e pro gr ess o n en hancing NATO-E U co o peratio n was n inde in 2000 and 2001
du e to a vari ety o f fac to rs, incl udi ng th e changing U S adm inistrations and th e Se p te m -
ber 11 atta cks an d N ATO 's first - ever Arti cle 5 o pe ration in respo nse. H o w e ver, by 2002,
the European Council felt it cou ld successfully mount a m ilitary op era tio n with acc ess to
NATO assets, and offered to take over peacekeeping in th e former Yugoslav R epublic of
M aced on ia (FY R O M ) from NATO, o n th e co nd itio n th at the Berli n Plu s agreeme nt was
co nclud ed bcforc haud" E ven ea rl ier, in 200 1, th e EU Special R ep resentati ve had o pe n ly
proposed an EU take o ver of op erations 1Il FY R.O M, bur this W~l S j udged b y bo th N ATO
and th e EU to be p renl :ltUre .' (·""
The ur gen cy of ag ree ing a successo r to th e 199() Be rlin agreement be cam e clea rer ,
wi th th e E U taki ng official and o pe n opposition to Turkey's stance w hi ch at that po int
co nt inue d to lock LIp any progress in the N o rth Atlanti c C o uncil o n Be rlin Plus. The issue
o f an E U takeo ver of peacekeeping in FYR OM becam e so im po rtan t to the EU that France
and B elgiu m j ointl y co nsid e red , but ultimat ely decid ed aga inst, an indep enden t mil itary op-
eratio n there that w o uld be wi th o ut any recourse to NATO asset s.:" NATO 's position wa s
that th e " pa rt ic ipatio n issue," th at is, the di fferences bet ween NATO and E U m embershi p,
was th e linc hp in in th e B erlin Plus negori arions.:"
E ventually, pr o gress becam e so bogged do wn th at th e EU wa s force d to take an offic ial
position o n the issue . It stated th at E SOP wo uld " und er no circumstances be used again st
a]n] lNATO] AUy," w ith th e stated assumption of a reciprocal p ro mi se by N AT O to not
use Alli ance assets aga iIlS t an y EU member, NATO m ember or not. The EU fur t he r stated
th at C yp rus, w h ich wa s slate d to and eve ntually did become an E U member in 2004, wo uld
not parti cip ate in ESD P o perations . '''.11 T his, co m bined w ith Greece so ften ing its sta nc e
o n potenti al Turki sh E U mem bership, led to Turkey dropping its o bj ect io ns in the N orth
Atlanti c C o u ncil. This episod e clea rly shows th e lin kage be tween NATO and EU politi cs
not o n ly in ge nera l, b ut also bet w een th e spec ific areas of military coope ra tio n and genera l
EU for eig n policy.
III.B. THE BERLIN PLUS AGREEMENTS: AGREEMENT, IMPLEMENTATION, AND OPERATION
B arely in time fo r th e March 3 1, 2003 launch o f th e ESO P mi ssion Ope ratio n CO II -
cordia, and just th ree days befo re th e U S in vasio n of Iraq, th e B erlin Plus agreements came
into fo rce o n th e l Zth of that m onth after an exchange of letters bet w een CFS P High R ep-
resentati ve Sola na and N ATO Secretary- G eneral Lord R obertson . AJ] but one of the indi -
vid ual Jg ree men ts had been finalized in lat e 2002 , but US in sisten ce th at all pa rts, in clu di ng
the key Secu rity of l nfo rma rio n ag ree m ent tha t covered th e han d ling of classified N ATO
docum ents by th e EU, should be finaliz ed befo re th e e nt ire pa ckage could COll ie into force
de layed the fin al da te somewhat ." The U S w as no t likely try in g to derail th e agreement,
but attem p ting to ensure th e secur ity o f its classified informa tio n . a large vo lume of wh ic h
it m akes available to N ATO allies , the UK in pa rti cul ar .":'
The Berlin PJus agreements are a series of separa te acc ords reached between NATO
and the E uro pea n U nion on Decem ber 1n, 2002 (again , no t fina lized u ntil March 17 of
the followi ng ye ar) , and co nce rn seve n m ajor areas of coope ratio n, accord ing to SHA PE
(Supreme Headquarters Alli ed Powers Europe, NATO's m ilitary headq uarte rs) :
1. NATO - EU Security Agreement [as d escr ibed ab o ve]
2. Assured Access to NA T O pla n ning capabil it ies fo r EU-led C risis Managem ent
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O perat ions (C M O)
3. Availab ilitv o f N ATO assets and capabilities fo r EU-led CMO
4. Procedures for R elease. Monitorin g, R e ru m and R ecall o f N AT O Assets an d
Capabiliti es
5. Terms Of R eference for DSACEU R and European Coiuum nd Options for
NATO
(I. EU-NAT O co nsult.u io n arrangem ent s in th e context of all EU-led CMO mak-
ing use of NATU asset s and cap abiliti es
7 . Arra nge me nts fo r co he ren t and mutually reinforcin g Ca pability R e q ui reme nts"
The actu al text o f th ese .rgreem cn ts is classified , and so un fo rtunately is un available for
analysis. It is possibl e only to interpret th e state me nts and pu blic decisio ns mad e by vario us
acto rs in order to determ ine the structure and fun ction of the agreem ents. A key do cument
to co nside r IJl such an analysis is the D ecember 2002 "EU-NATO D ecl aratio n on ESOP."
D espite its lack of spec ifics. it provides an o utline o f the Berlin Plu s agree ments and a COI11 -
m on o pinio n o n thei r purpose and fun cti on o n th e part o f NATO and the E U . In the do cu -
ment, th er e is recognition that N ATO .md th e E U are " o rganizatio ns of a different nature,"
and cond uct " crisis manageiu eur act ivi ties. . . [whi ch] are mutually rein forcin g ," w hic h in
co ntex t is like ly refer ring to th e strictly mi litar y and milirary- civiliuu coo pera tive nature ,
respectively, of the o rganizatio ns. It also sta tes th at th ere shall be "equality and du e regard
for decision-makin g auto nom y ... of th e Eur opea n U nion an d N ATO ," w hich impl ies no
rights of veto o ver or involvement III th e decision-making process o f th e o ther for eith er
o rganizatio n. T he document then addresses th e ov erlapping m embership of the two organi -
zarions hy stating th at " the European U nion is ensu ring th e fullest possible involvement o f
non-EU E uro pean members o f NATO within ESO P," w hich ex cludes th e US and Canad a
but includes Turkey. Finall y. it contain s lan gua ge that allows the EU irr evo cabl e acc ess to
NATO plann ing fac ilities , but th at all o the r assets and capabi lities w ill be mad e ava ilable
o n J case- by- case basis. The doc umen t and th e agreem ents do not o bv io usly include refer-
ence to an important co ncept to consider, w hich is one of th e most co nt rove rsial areas in
NATO-EU military relations: the " right o f first refusal. "< 5
II/.B.l. The Right of First Refusal: Differing Positions on NATO Primacy
T o expla in th e right o f first refu sal, o ne ca n cr ea te a hvporhct ical situ atio n where th er e
ex ists a problem in a European co untry, no t a m em be r o f NA T O o r o f th e EU , but perh aps
looking towa rds membership in eithe r o rganizatio n in th e future. It is decided b y the EU
that a peacek eeping o peratio n wo uld be necessary and helpful to the si tuatio n. If N ATO in
fact has a stric tly define d right o f first refusal, the EU wo uld he o bligated to ask if NAT O
wished to un dertake an operation 111 th at area. If the answer were negati ve . th e E U co uld
proceed Ind ep en dentl y or with an op erat ion under Berlin Plus. If th e answ er were positi ve .
NATO wo uld be o bligated to und ert ake th e o pera tion and the EU wo uld not be inv ol ved
mi litari ly ;IS an o rga n izatio n. C onversely, if NATO does not have a right of fmt refu sal, the
EU would not be o bligated to ask NA T O if it had an inter est i n an operatio n , and co uld
p roce ed directl y to undertaking it itself o r ask ing fo r recourse' to N ATO assets und er Berli n
Plu s.
If such a rig ht ex ists, it wo uld seem to im ply th at NAT O co uld indefinitel y hold lip
an operation proposed by the EU that wou ld use only EU assets, by co nt inuo usly d iscussing
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the desire o n the part o f NA TO to undertake th e ope ration . As we will see, thi s docs not
app ear to he th e case. The Berlin Plus ag ree me n ts do not by all acco unts co ntain ,lny refe r-
ence to a rig ht of first refusal; thus it rem ains un clear whether or not NATO possesses such
a right. Fro m sta tem ents mad e by NATO. th e EU . and NATO mem be r states, it is clear
that th ere are differing evaluations of th e existen ce of the right .
The Uni ted States has argned since at least 1992 that NAT O is th e "prefer red institu-
tion to act , whereve r possible ," and that it recognizes that the Allian ce " might no t act,"
w he re upo n " [the US] agr eed to m .ike N ATO assets availab le to the Europea n Unio n." ",
This appears to be no t only an assertion th at NA TO does ind eed possess th e right of first
refusal, hut also a virt ual guarantee, as abo ve and stated later III 1995 by US Am bassado r to
NATO R ob ert H unt er, of NAT O assets for ,HI EU (or WEU) o pe ration . At var io us points.
the U S Cong ress has also demand ed the righ t of first refusal be acco rde d to N AT O III w rit-
ing by the E U .<7 The E U, ho wever continually asse rts its "dec ision- making auto n ollly ,"<K
tho ugh this seem s to be partially co ntradicted by the und ispu ted fact that un der both the
CJT F mechanism and Berlin Plu s, NATO wo uld have to unau iruou sly agree to release its
assets to a W E U o r EU mi ssio n. The EU of co urse states its right to auton or u ously con-
du ct ESO P mil itary ope ratio ns <IS its sees fit , bu t w itho ut absolutely guarant ee d reco urse to
N ATO asse ts, its optio ns are m ore luuired , as we w ill see below .
Ju st before the fin al co nclusion of the Berl in Plus agr eem ents, th e " E U- N AT O D ecla-
rat io n on ESOP" was agreed by the E U and NA TO , wh ich stated th at the EU sho uld have
the ahility to conduct operations whe re "the allian ce as a wh ole is not en gaged. "' 9 A lite ral
readin g of th is state me nt wo uld seem to indi cat e tha t the EU cannot operate w here NATO
is already o perating as an alliance. This interpretation is not d isput ed by eithe r NA TO or the
EU .;< ' T he U ni ted States , however, and furrh crmorc. the N ATO Sec rerary-Geueral, have
stated their in terpret ations of the statem ent as "w he re the alliance as a wh ole chooses no t to
be engaged ," \1 and that "the EU w ill only co nsider undertakin g operations where NATO
as a w ho le has decided not to be engaged ," respec tively, and indicating o fficial NATO
agree me nt w ith th e more restrictive (in the view o f the EU) int erpretatio n . The official
int erp retation by the Secre tary-C encra l may be even more rest ricti ve, as it states , in effect ,
that th e EU lllay not even officially consid e r I n ope ratio n, Jet alon e un der take one. until
afte r NATO has decided to not involve itself in the same area .
Thus, it appea rs that NATO has a dcjacto, bu t defmitelv no t dejure, right o f'firsr refu sal,
tho ugh N ATO co nc rete ly and und isp uredl y reta ins the right to refuse the use o f its assets
by th e EU. W hen raking into accou nt the very likely sce nario that the EU wo uld he un -
able to mou nt an effective ope ratio n except wit h re course to N AT O assets. th is effectively
gives NATO and , signifIcantly, non-E U NATO me m bers, a veto over the ope ratio n. The
qu estio n of ,1 d(' .«We> versu s a de ju re right is imp ortant to co nsider in ligh t of the fact that
all statements and Jgree nlents on EU-NAT O co operation are not legally binding und er
inrc rna rional law, that is, they have not been w ritte n int o J ny form aI treaties o r agrccmcuts.
T hey have sim ply bee n laid o ut piecemeal i ll press releases. co mm uniques, and in the case
of the Berlin Plus agr eeme nts them selves, w hat .u uouut to "ex ecutive agreem ents" between
the NATO Secretarv - Ceneral and the EU Hi gh R epresentative for C FSP51 Thus, the
statements and agreelllenrs are on ly diplomat ically bin ding in that it w ill be politically dif-
ficult fo r either o rganizatio n to act cont rary to w hat it had previo usly stated in on e of the
abo veme nt ion ed ways.
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III.C POST-BERLIN PLUS MILITARY OPERATIONS
III.Cl. Background
It l1l<ly be helpful In <In opaque analysis (due to classification of relevant documents)
of the Berlin Plus agreements to briefly analyze several military operations undertaken by
the involved actors, including both operations by the EU not conducted under Berlin Plus
but conducted independently after the conclusion of the agreement, and operations by the
EU considered but ultimately not conducted at all, It is first necessary, however, to men-
tion the NATO operations in FYROM, Operations Essential Hnrvcst, Amber Fox, and /lllicd
Harnuntv, as background for the later EU operations. These operations were tasked with the
disarmament of ethnic Albanian groups and the destruction of their weapons. This neces-
sarily involved ground forces, the overwhelming majority of which were contributed by
European NATO members. with the UK being the "lead" nation and the United States
only providing logistical support. This was basically an example of the "separable but not
separate" capabilities envisioned in the Saint-Malo agreement: a "European operation under
the NATO fl<lg,"" .md a logical step not only on the W,ly to renlOvlllg the WEU from a
direct link between NATO and the EU, but also to the h.mdover of nearly all operations 1!l
FYROM from NATO to the EU.
III.C2. Post-Berlin Plus Military Operations: Concordia
The European Council felt that ESDP was well-developed enough to take over opera-
tions in FYROM from NATO, while still using NATO assets, in 2002, but was in Jgree-
ment that Berlin Plus should be finalized beforehand, which occurred on March 17, 2003
with the aforementioned exchange of letters. \< Concordia began on March 31. The opera-
tion was undertaken within the Berlin Plus framework and allowed the EU to take direct
control of NATO assets, Its main task was to continue to ensure the implementation of the
Ohrid Fr.unework Agreement between ethnic Albanians and FYROM forces. Command
of the operation had already been held by the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands while it
W<lS under the command of NATO, and the EU desired continuity in this area."
Command of Concordia was structured, JS Berlin Plus envisioned, with the Deputy
SACEUR, a European, as the operation commander and the operation headquarters <It
NATO's AFSOUTH (now known asJFC Naples) 1!l Italy, with an EU chain of command
following from there. The EU force could call for backup or relief at any time which would
have been provided by KFOR Rear, <I NATO force, which remained in FYROM for a
variety of reasons, not the least of which W<lS that the Maccdonian public had an existing
relationship with and trust in NATO, which had made a point of mounting regulJr, visible,
and heavilv-armed patrols m the country during its operations. This continuity of presence
and operational linkage W,IS necessary for the EU's mission to be successful."
Concordia was generally judged to be a success and ended in December 2003 after
havlllg been extended past its original end date by three months following an upsurge in
violence In the [Ill. It was followed by a civilian (but still ESDP) police mission, EUPOL
Proxima, which reflected J more general trend in the Balkans from a need for direct mili-
tary peacekeeping to a need for militarized civilian law enforcement. The highest-ranking
dual-hatted officer at JFC Naples was the Chief of Staff, who simultaneously acted as the
JFC Naples Chief of Staff and the EU Command Element Chief of Staff,,7 Likely in part
due to this dual-hatted post, the main problem with Concordia was seen as the questionable
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autonom y o f th e EU Command Element atJFC Naples, w h ich wa s suppos ed to be able to
indepe nd entl y fo rm ulare and give order s to th e E U fo rces. This ma y have had somethi ng to
do w it h th e fac t that u nd er Berl in Plus, the operati o nal co m m and er is ge ne rally the D eputy
SAC EU R., w ho fu nc tio ns in a " d ual-h atred " rol e as bo th th e NAT O D ep uty SACEUR
and th e EU o pe ra tio n con uu ander ." COl/cordia also did not resolve the q uestio n o f the ex -
istence of a righ t of fi rst refusal. bec ause th e ope ratio n was a tak eo ver fro m N ATO, not a
situati o n w here both NAT O and the EU had p o tentia l in teres t in cond uc ti ng a ne w o pe ra-
tion. T he co nstant presence of K FOR Rear also raises questions abo ut the abili ty at th e tim e
of th e E U fo rce to deal w ith an y unforese en sev e re pr oblem.
D esp ite th e cri t ic ism s leveled at Concordia, it w as the first successful mission ca rr ie d
o ut und e r Be rlin Plu s. The im plicati ons o f its success do not go far beyo nd dem o nstrat in g
th e ability o f N ATO and th e EU to coo pe rate di rectl y, because th e re was little co nt rove rsy
in vo lved in th e planni ng o f th e EU mi ssion or in th e liando ve r process it self It w as n one-
theless a successful mis sio n and th e next sign ifi cant Berlin Plu s ope ratio n , Operat io n Althea ,
commen ced in 2004, w ould be ano the r takeove r o f a preexist in g N ATO mission , thi s tilne
in B osni a and H erzego vin a (BiH) . However, d uring the intervening pe riod , the European
U n ion m o ved to undert ake its own m ilita ry o pera t io n both o u tside N ATO 's European area
of in vo lvem e nt and w ith o ut th e use o f Berlin Plus. T he pla nn ing and co nd uct o f th i, ope r,l-
tio n Illay give di fferent an swer s as to th e in terpre ta tio ns of a right o f first refu sal.
1II.C.3. Post-Berlin Plus Military Operations: Artemis
T h e E SDP mis sion O pe rat io n Artemis, co nd ucted by th e E U w itho ut an y recou rse to
NAT O asse ts an d no t und er Berl in PIn s, W,JS carr ied out in th e D em o cratic R epu bli c of
C o ngo in June 2003 , actin g u nd e r a UN Securi ty C o u ncil mandare and Wit h th e o bjec tives
o f resto ri ng o rde r in th e tOWIl of Bunia an d o f reli e vin g th e UN M O N U C fo rce already
rhere." Artemis w as tim e-Iimi ted and end ed in Se pte m ber of th e sall ie yea r. \Vhile deci dedl y
on a sm alle r sc ale than e it he r Concordia or A III/ca, it W;JSsti ll a mi litary de plo ym ent conce ive d
and undertaken by th e EU in Africa and n otably used no N AT O (o r US) airl ift capa biliry .:"
In M ay 2003 , th e E U m ade a decision between ,111 indep endent ESDP operati on an d
a Berl in Plus o peratio n, and th e fo rme r was chose n for a var iety of reasons, some of w hich
may have impli cati o ns o n th e possibili ty of th e existe nc e of a righ t of first refu sal. First , co n-
tin ual impro vement s in EU m ember state military coope rat io n and capab ilit ies h ad reac hed
a po int w he re an in dep endent o pe ratio n appea re d feas ible . Th is e ncouraged th e E U to act
as n o t on ly a test of it s capa bili ties but as a de monstration that it was able to do so inde -
pe nd entl y. Second, th e U S wa s very unlik ely to ag ree to a N AT O -supported inte rvention
in Africa after its di sastrou s intervention in So m alia III 19Y3 and its refusal to m rerveue in
Lib e ria ea rlie r in 2003 . Britain and Fran ce , o n th e o the r hand, h ad in de p enden tly inte rvened
in Afr ica in 2000 and 2002 and were conti nui ng bo th to stre ngthe n Eu rop ean defens e ca-
pab ilities and coo perat io n o n sec urity in A frica and to heal th e rift bet ween EU m embers
over th e Ira q Wa r.u)
Pr epara tions fo r A neinis minimi zed t he NATO-E U relati o nship. Init ially pla nned ,IS
a purel y French operati on , n either Fran ce nor the EU m ade an y re quest fo r co nsultatio n
w it h NATO at least as far as public reco rds sho w . Earl y in Ju ne 2003, High Repres enra-
tive So lana o utline d th e E U 's pla ns fo r A rtemis to th e N orth A tlan t ic Council. N ATO was
surp rised by th e ex te nt o f plan ning fo r th e o pe rat io n, and was presented m ore or less w ith a
fait acco m pli by the EU, and b y Fran ce to a ce rt ain exte m ,,1 Even if NATO had been given
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all o ppo rtuni ty to co nsid er (and ult im atel y n:ien) p.rrnc ip.u ron , it likel y w o uld hav e had
tro ub le d efe lldi ng its d cri sio u to op pose th e undertak ing o t- w hat "',IS esse nrially a hum.ur i-
r.rri.u: o pera tio n Clearly . th e EU did no t in te rpre t ,lilY \;ght o f tirsr refusa l as one " w he re th e
all iance as ~l w ho le has d ecid ed 1l0l1O be ellg;lged." becau'l' it h.rd 1I0t b rou ght all Yproposals
to N ATO tor its refusal before co n u n cucing the operati on .
III ;1 pre" conferen ce foll o wing the s('" io n, Se crerar y- C cu erul Lord Robertson stated
th at " N ATO wo uld 1I 0t want co be ellg;lged " be cau se NA TO 's st rategic interests were e lse-
w here . A mem ber of th e Secrerary-Ceucrals stafT, howe ver. w as 1II0re candid in his remarks
when h e stated th at the y were " d isturbed" by Fran ce 's plann ing m ethod olog y, c1ailll ing
that France had in it ially ca lled for an " in reruatio nal fo rce 0 11 th e bas is of a 'coal itio n of th e
wi lling .' [a CJ T F] th en pla nt ed the Europea n Hag over it. H o w 1I0t to conside r it as a dclih-
c rate plan to shortc u t th e ' pc n u une ut arrangcll lcnts' [Berl in Plus] agTeed between N AT O
and th e Eu ro pe an Union ?":" T h e o pera tio n was fu rther criticized ,IS a " Fre nc h opera tio n
w it h an EU cover" du e to the extre m ely high prop o rtion o f Fre nc h troop co ntri bution ami
ex te nsive Frencli planning ; nea rly six ty percent of the staff o f the operation headqua rters
we re French ofhcc rs."'
D espite these cri t icism s. th e o pera tion was succ essful ly ca rr ied out an d the pla n ne d
ESD i> framework fu nc tio ned as inrc nded . with th e EU Pol it ical and Secu rit y C on nni rrec
exerc ising full politi cal .md strategi c con tro l at all rim es. It was not. h o we ver. a d em o nstra-
tio n o f trul y uni versally iudepeudeu r ESDi> m ilirary ca pa bility . as th e EU req uired m o re
st rategic uirlifr than was av ai lable fro m EU mem bers, This ncccssirarcd th e co nrn bu rio us of
ai rlift capabilirv by Brazil ian and Ca nad ian aircraft, as well as ledsed Russian ,Iircr aft '" (co be
t:lir to th e EU, the U S also occasio n ally lease s R ussian aircr.rfr to conduct its inde penden t
m ilita ry o pe ratio ns du e to a LI ck of needed Clp~lC i ry). " " ,4 "'('/111" Illay demonstrate t he .ihili ty
o f the EU to mr crvcu e ill places N AT O cannot or do cs not w ish to go.
/II.C.4. The Moldovan Non-Operation
Finally. tlu-rc wa s an iu ciden r su rr o und ing a possible EU iutervent io n in M old o va III
1(l().l . Sin ce th e brea kaway " T ransn istrian Repu blic" cla imed a portion of M o ldo va 's ter-
rito ry in I \)\)(), the regi on had been a so ur ce of instabi lit y and cr ime, bur not large-selic
viol ence. Still. it appears t ha t all ES O P optio ns w ere co ns idered by th e EU Politi cal and
Security Conuuirrce , in clu d ing a police unssiou . all indep endent military mis sion, .md ;1
Berlin Plus military mi ssion . T he Berlin Plus military nii ssio n was initiall y co nsid er ed to be
th e most flvo rable path , but d iscussio ns with NATO led to the United States " vche m e utlv
rej ect ing" th e idea of an in depen d ent ESDP mi ssio n and f:lvo ring a B erlin Plus oper atio n .
After the sum m e r of 10(l3, the m utter d ropped otT t he age lllb of th e EU and it has since
restricted in vol vement iu Moldova to diplom.uic .uri virv .md a bo rd e r-mon ito rin g m issio n
se nt on t he j o int re quest of t he Moldovan and Ukra inia n govc rn lllents .,,7
It is difficult to discern w hethe r or not this w as an insta uce of N AT O exercising a rig hr
o f firsr refusal. Ne ither th e EU nor N ATO pro ceeded w ith any action co ncern ing Moldova
aftl'r the aforem ention ed di scussio ns betw een th e Politi cal and Securi ty Com m ittee and th e
North Atlantic Counci l. Sin ce it call be argu ed th at a n ght of fir st refusal must be exer cised
hy the n ght holder su bsequently Ktin g o n th e pro posal itself. the res ul t is th at this particu -
LI r case is inconclusive and that N AT O co ntiu ues to have such a righ t o nly in th e form of
de ny iug ;lCCl',S to cr ucia l capabilit ies for an operatio n .
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III.C.S. Interlude: The EU States Its Preferences For Future Operations
In Decem ber 2()()3, til e European Cou nc il rel eased an uuport.mt doc u me n t ou tlin ing
its pre fe rences for N AT O - E U niilitarv co o peration . Entitled " Euro pean D efeuce: NATO I
E U Consu ltation, 1)l anllillg and O pera tio ns ," it o ut lines th e ELI's pr eferen ces fo r mili r.rry
operati ons In a hi era rcliical fls hio n . It IS im po rtant to no te t hat NATU W;IS not invo lve d in
th e dr; \fi: in g o f th is do tu u ie nr. :"
Tlie d OCUIII l'llt presents fo ur o p t io ns , in o rder o f p refe rcn rc o f use: fi rst, th e EU pre-
fers a NATO- lcd c.n u p.ugn with no independent EU cle me nt . This Illay ind ica te the E U 's
tacit acceptance 01' ;1 right of fi rst refusal by NATO , hut it do es not sp ec ifically say so. Tli e
second op tio n IS an E U - Ied o perat io n un der th e political and strateg ic co n tro l of th e Po-
litic.rl and Se n ili ty Cou u u itree, usin g NAT O plannill g f lc ilit ies and assets, This is a Berlin
Plus-type o pe ra tio n . Third , the EU pre fe rs an in d e pe nd e nt opera t ion wi thou t recou rse to
NATO assets, with an EU me m ber state act ing as a lead ing " fr.unew o rk nation " . The lea st
preferabl e o ption is an inde pende nt o pera t io n sim ilar to th e third op tio n b u t with th e EU
Military St;lff (;1 military h od y atta ch ed to the office of th e Hi gli R epresentati ve for C FS P)
acting as the lead unit .?"
C lea rly th ere is ~l prefe ren ce and assum ption 0 11 the part o f the E U that it w ill w o rk
clo sel y wi th NATO d u ring th e ini t ial phases of planning In ope ratio n in o rd e r to d et e rmi ne
if th e fir st o p t io n is feas ih le . NATO':; respo nse to th e document , as o u tli ne d in Secre tary-
General R o bertson 's comments. was o ne o f gene ral agree illent, hut depar te d from th e E U 's
bllgu age in tw o im po rt au t ar eas . First, Instead of o nly th e seco nd option b e ing 111 th e pur-
vie w of the Berlin Plus agree me nts, it add it io na lly placed o p tio ns th ree a nd four "within
the con text" of Berl in PIll' . T h is app ears to have b een ,111 attem pt by NATO 1101' to co-opt,
hut at leas t to in sert a remin der into EU - centnc o pe ra t io ns t ha t it remain ed th e EU's " first
cho ice " sec ur ity prov ide r. Second , th e re w as di sagreement with Iangtl age reLltillg to a right
of tirst refusal. T he EU 's dor um c nt sta le d it w ould undertak e non- NAT O -l ed opera tions
" w here NATO as a w hole is not cng;lged," whil e N ATO re phrase d it as "where N ATO
as a w ho le has dec ided n or to he enguged ," n early ident ical to th e U S languagt' o n th e
m atter as described above . H ere , w hile th e EU's langu age is in det erm in ate ~I S to NATO's
rig ht o f firs t re fusa l. NATO states it dea rl y, thus th e d isagreement over th e ex iste nce of th e
right. NATO beli e ves it to be a matte r o f fact and the EU is not certai n ; whe n t he subject
is di scu ssed at both o rg uuizu t io ns. di ffe rent langu age is used w hich refl ects thei r respective
vie w poi u ts.?"
The EU do cu me n t is not legaUy bi nding7I and am oun ts to a declar atio n by th e EU
of its preferen ces fo r cooperation (o r non-coope ration) w ith NATO , th ough it wo uld be
d iffi cult to defen d ~ I sit ua tio n in w h ic h the EU viola ted th is o rder of pre fe rence afte r th e
rel ease of th e do cument . The f;ln that the third and fourth o ptio ns a re m cnri on ed ;11' all, and
esp ecially III th e sallie d o cu m ent as an o pt io n w here N ATU co nd uc ts an operation it sel f
In cr eases the likel ih ood th at they will be pursued an d implies that th e task o f Eu rop ean cri sis
Inan ;lgelll en t IS, in th e VIew of I'he E U . sh iftillg away from N ATO to itself
."! rl l'l ll is roo k place before th e EU released the aboveme utio ned do cument o u tlini ng
its p re fer ences for the fo rm.n o f mil itary o pe ratio ns . II' IS possib le rh .n the docu m ent was, in
part, released to reas sure N ATO th at it would not , in th e' future. ign o re' its conuuitments
to ea rly co nsu ltat io n during th e pla nn ing phases o f an o pera t ion . as it had don e in the case
of A rtctu!» .
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1/I.C.6. Post-Berlin Plus Military Operations: Althea
The EU h.id o fficia lly o ffere d to take over th e m ission o f N AT O\ SFO R in 2lJlJ2;lt
its Copenhagen Sununi t" , hut was un.rbl c to do so bt'Clu se of the th c u- inromp lctc Berlin
Plu s af-,'Teenlent. NATO had been the only organi zati on that h.id enough cred ibi lity with .rll
sides in BiH to co n rin uc to impk-mcnt the D;lyton Fr.uue work Agreelllent, whi ch h.id been
broke red by the United States, EU , .md n.. ussian in 1l)l)5. US involvement In BiH had been
hcsir.mr througho ut NATO 's co n m u n uc nts there . as it had never been a spec ific security
concern o f th e U S (apa rt Irom gcneral Eu ropean stability conc erns) , th ou gh th ere was d
sm.rll uiea sure o f concern over stc u u n ing possibl e Iranian influen ce th ere .7 \ As with COl/cor-
dia, European states, m ost signific an tly France an d th e UK, w ere th e m ain troop co urribu -
tors to NATU's previou s mi ssion as they had also [we n in the UN mi ssion in 13iH as w ell.
NATO had pr eviou sly judged an EU tak eo ver o f S FO R ill 20n ..j to he premature . hut
o nce Genu.my j oined all Anglo-French prop osal to take over SFUR in late 2lJOl and the
EU declared itself " ready " to do so, NAT O was m oved to agree in principle- that a take-
o ve r hy the EU co uld happ en . All parti es ag ree d th at to ensure continuity o f presence, the
EU mi ssion was to be cond ur ted und er Berlin Plu s. hut also that NAT U wou ld m.unr.uu
a headquarters th er e and reser ve so me part, o f SF O R 's mi ssion for itself: speci fiedly , th e
co n tinu ing hunt fo r w ar rriui iuuls in Bil-i , milirary rcf orm , and prep aring the co u urry for
participurion in the Part ne rshi p for [)cace program ." NATO also need ed to mainrain ;1 pres-
ence ill BiH. ;IS o ne co uu ucn taro r put it , because th e local population did not trust th e EU
to protect them, and that the Europeans w er e "the ones who sat th er e and did nothiug fo r
four years while th ey we re slaughtered . .. land that] the Ameri cans [were] the people wh o
ca in e in and saved them ." 7'
SFO Il w as rc rmin ated in juuc 2( )(1..j and declar ed its readin ess to hand over the InaJor-
it )' o f its responsibilities to th e EU under Berlin Plus. A itlu:a be gan o ffiL:ia lly o n December 2 ,
2lJlJ..j. The U S positi on o n the tak eo ver dercrmiued NATO's stance " virt ually" at all rim es.
;JS it had been the princi pa l arch itect of th e politi cal peace in BiH , if not th e milit.uv pex e .
The emphasis o n a Ber lin Plus m ission was ;1 W ;IY fo r th e U S to allay Congress io nal skc pri-
cism that th e EU would he able to do NATO \j oh in BiH an d fears t hat th e U S was slowly
being excluded fro m European security. Again , ;IS with Con conli«, rile D eputy SACEUP,
ac ted as th e o pera tion co uu u undcr, but thi s tim e the operational h eadqu art ers was located at
SH A PE . Aulu:a was a larger-scale test for Berlin Plus, and so t i l' has been successful in th at
there have be en no m ajor hang-ups in NAT O -EU cooperation . The ope ratio n is on go in g
as o f April 2000 . As m curioned above . th e E U has also be en a be tte r c ho ice to de al with th e
shift from a n eed for milita ry peacekeep ing to militarized law e n fo rce me nt , and from large-
scale violen ce to organized and fill an ci;d cri me ;IS it is m ore able to deplo y civ ilian poli ce
missions. " NAT O is not ;1 law enforce me nt o rga nizatio n and ca nnot readil y dra w o n law
enforcement personnel the way th e EU C UI. lu tlet . concerns ;lIno ng EU m embers th at the
EU military fo rce should not be involved in law enforcement in BiH led to the dcpl ovm cu r
of the EU Poli n ' Mi ssion to coordinate ESDP assistance to BiH police instead of going
throu gh th e mil itary force.'7
A lthea cam e clos er to resol vin g th e quest io n of a right o f first re fusal. The EU did not
o ffic ially decl are its interest in J mi ssion in Bosni a unt i] N ATO an no u nced that it w ould
rcrunnare SFO R in 2004.1" T h is wa it in g period likel y held up E U planning o f a missio n in
BiH until NATO urmo u nced it w as amenab le to an EU tak eo ver. Tins nrav again indicate
tacit EU acceptan ce of NATO's right ;1, int erp ret ed by th e "where th e alliance ;IS ;1 w ho le
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is not c ng aged" phLI \ing . as NA T O w as not e ng; lged in . and in ( IC t. had just dis en gaged
from til l' cap ;Kit il'S tile EU assu med w he n / 1/( /(('1! W;lS launched . N everthel ess, Althcn d cm-
onsrrarcd closer NATO-EU cooperation at all level s. .md show ed rh.ir th e NATO -EU
relati onship is st ro ng a nd fu nct io nal.
IV. CONClUSION
Thus Wl' have see n that there ar e Ind eed difTerlll g o p lillo ns o n the exis te nce o f rights
acc o rd ed to NATO under its a ~'Te elll elltS w ith the European Union . It is unlikel y that we
will kn ow tor ce rt ain of th e e xiste nce OL I right o f fir st refu sal until a ne w con flict arises ill all
ar ea w here both NATO and the E U wish to take acti on . Even if such a situation d oes arise,
because 110 right is co ucrc tc ly e nsh rine d in a ny publicly av a ilable doc n me nt. it lIl;lY be that
NATO and th e EU wiJl sim plv negotiate ;IS to w hic h o rgan iza tion w ill he the one to tak e
acti on. This possibility is indicative of a gr eat er trend ill NATO-EU relations afrer Berlin
Plus towards o pen ncss . dipl oma cy, .m d politi cal pragmari sm b et w een th e tw o organi zations .
We have also see n that there has be en a clear progression o f the NATO-EU niilira ry
relati onship th at required spec ific act io n on bo th m embers to 1l10 VC forward; th e relation -
ship h.is not been subject to circumstance o r expedience. M oreover. we have seen that
durillg o perat io ns conducted between the two o rga n izatio ns . e ve n ts pr ogressed smoo thly
.uid bo th NATO and th e EU exe rte d significant effo rt to wo rk co o pe rati vel y and success-
full y in pursuit o f COil 1111 011 goals. In more th.m on e instance. the EU ack n o w ledged th e
ne cessit y of keeping N ATO directl y in volved ill th e E uro pea n sec u rity ar ea , and co nv ersel y .
NAT O determ ined th at in vol vement o f the EU w as Ilec essary for the long-rerm success o f
its undertakin gs.
At present , NATO and th e EU ha ve a co m plica te d relati onship: com pleme urary . and
at th e san lt' time , .id vcrsarial. as the status o f NATO 's ve to o r ab ility to co-op t all ESDP
operation remains undetermined . ln 20 Ut), NATO w ill ha ve ex isted for sixty yea rs, an d
Europe continues tow ards becom ing m ore peaceful and requ iring less military and more
pol iti cal inr crvcutiou . The important rela tionship bet ween th e NATO and th e EU will
undoubtedly continue to c hallge alo ng w it h the co nriuu.rlly shift ing sec u rity realiti es in th e
Euro -Atlauti r ar ea.
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63 I Appendix 1: Timeline of NATO-EU Relations, 1989-2009
- CJTF Agreement Signed (6/96)
- Operation Artemis Begins (6/03)





- Operation Althea Begins (12/2/04)
Iraq War Begins (3/ 20/03)









NATO Operations Begm in K0501/0
(3,/99)
- Helsinki Headline Goal (12/99)
- saint-Malo Summit(12/4/98)
NATO Operanons Begin
in Former vuqostavra ( J/ 93)
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- Treaty of Amsterdam Signed (10/2/97)
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16 Dec . 2002
EU-NATO Declaration on ESOP
THE EURO PEAN UNION AN D THE NORTH ATLANTIC TR EATY
ORGANI SATlON,
• V"~h...UII "t:: lll~ ~lt d tt:';f i(., "'d ll lJ~1 ~h iJl t::~l rJ LJIi~Iu;~u Ut:-l""t:t:ll lltoc:: EUI U lJt:OcUi
u mon and NATO m cr isi s ma nagement, founded on our sha red values,
the indivi sibili ty of our secunrv and our neterrrunat ion to tackle t he
cnauenocs o f the new Century ;
• Welcome th e continued im port an t ro le of NATO in cris is m anagemen t
lind wnmet prevention, lind reillfi rm tha t NATO rema ins the
foundat ion of the col lective defe nce of i ts members;
• Welcome the European Securi ty anel Defence Policy (ESOP), whose
purpose Is to add to the range of Ins tr uments alre3l1y at the European
Un ion 's d isposa l to r ,ri5i~ manaqement an d co nrlic.t prev e nt ion in
supper of the Common r ore,g and seconrv Polley, the capacit y to
conduct EU-led cr isis man agemen t operations, incl Udi ng mi li tary
operations where NI\ TO as a whole is not engage d ;
• Reaffirm t hat a stronger European ro le will help contribute to th e
Vit ali ty of t he All iance, specifica lly In t he fiel d of cri sis manaocmcnt:
• Reaffirm their determination to strenqtnen their caoeorunes:
Declare that the relationship between the European Union and NATO
w ill be founded on the fo llowing pr inciples :
• Pc" l ll t::1~l l iV . ~ II.~U ' illL" l h a l I h~ l.I i~~ 1I Id ll n l/t"II I't:' lI l dl,. li v it i t::~ vr li lt::: l n v
orqamsa no ns are mu tu all y reintorc mq, wh ile recognising th at the
Europea n Union and NATO are organisations of a diffe r"nt nature;
• Effect ive mu tua l consu lta tio n, dia logue, cooperat ion an d t ransparen cy ;
• Equality and due regard fo r t he decision-mak ing autonom y an d
II1ler" " ls of the Eur op,MIl Un ion and NATO;
• Respect for the mte rests of tI e Mem bE'1 States of the European Union
and NA 0;
• RE'spect for th e pr tnctote s of th e Char ter of t he Unit ed Nations, wh ich
underlie the Treaty on European Union and the Washington Treat y, in
orde r to prov ide one of the mcrs pensetne foun dat ions fo r a stable
Euro-Attart t ic security environment , based on the commit ment to the
peaceful resolu t ion of disputes . In which no country wou ld be ab te to
inti midate or coe rce any other th rough th e threat o r use of force, and
also based on respect tor treat y righ ts and Obliga t ions as w!!11 as
re fraining fr om un ila ter al actions ;
• Coheren t, tr ansparen t and m utually re inforcing developm ent of t he
mi lit ary capabili ty requir ements com mon to the two organisa tions ;
To t is end :
• I he Euro pean Union Is ensur ing th e full est oossrble Involvem ent of
non-EU European members of NATO wit hin ESDP, im plE'me nt ing he
relevant NIce arr angeme nts , as set out In tne lett er from t he EU ~lig ll
Represe ntat iv e on 13 December 2002 ;
• NA a is support inq ESOP in accordence with the relevant Washington
Summ it decision s, and IS Qlving the European umon, inter ali a and in
part icula r, assured access to NATD 's planning capabilit ies, as set out in
the !lAC oeo sicns 0 <1 13 oecember 200 2;
• Bot h orqa rusanons have rccoqn tscd t he need for arrangements to
ensu re the coherent, transpa re n t and rnut ally reinforci ng
de ve lo pment o f t he capabl lit v req uirem en ts common \0 t he two
organisa t ions. wi th a SPirit of open ne ss.
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A p PENDIX 3
U !I{( WE·':" 1I1·:F E:-Il'E :
1\'\ T OW I' CIl '\SI II .T,H IO .... , I' L ..\ .... .... H\ ( ; ,\ .... U III'EN,\ T III ....S
Ruilllin,glin 111(.' l ' \ f k.:I' .L: l h..' t.' of Eli \.'i\ i lian t1Jh.lmi)j tal ) nJ~lill il ' n.. in 200.' alld 0 11the di..cu ..... idlh lin
ihc -c I WO .......11' ..... t 'lot~ t \\l~ l'· 11 ' hl' ( ' K. t'I-;Uk'l' ;1II11 Cj l·nna ll ~ . 1111'.. poll' '' ' ..L'1'o. H il i hn\ \ ihc colleer ivc
,";lpahi llts 01 Itl ,' El «In he -trcnpthcncd. i ndll din~ the ahJlny '" plan an,l run ce rtain opcrution-,
;111. 1d~ "'C rihc ' how con.... rdc rarion nf rhc nptilln, JOH11\"C'd wo uld t.Jkt"r"K'~ between EU P.111nrr, and
NATO Allie.•.
N~\TO i.. the forum h 'l d j~u " I\)n and the natu ral choice tor an l"IPl' fa l h'HI involvinp the European
'''HI Amcnca n " II Ie , . In nccordancc wuh the El :fN,AH .l pcm umcnr anallgc l11enl, ad opted 111 l\ ICC,
in .1 cri- i ... cuntact.... and Il K,,{, t i n g, w ill be mtcn...iflcd "-f l th. it El.I ;tnd Nt\ 10 ("~ 1I1 di ",,' (1 "" thei r
;J" C",...mcm -, n f n I L' ( riM'" ~ lIId d on ify therr in tcn u un-, n:!!;mlin~ po" ihk' l' n h!;lg t"nt c:nh . The
e xperience Hi' ~OO] ~hH\"> "" Ih;!! IJU: ' l: :..J rrangctJu:nt an.' rU lltl atll l' l lI~.d l ~ sound. prov iJ ill ~. for
inrcn-,i f -d con culta tiun. while J~"'JlL~ l ir' t! full y the dcci i\ ln. lIla)'; i ll ~ au ronomy \ It t t\l l h l )r~i.tn i "l ~ l t ion, .
where "';,\ TO a ., whole j-, nor e n~i l~c,l. the EI.1. In undcnakinp an opcrtuion, will d ,no'-Cwhether
or nol 10 h:l\ c rcl,:our.-oc ro ,'J ATo a'"c ' '' an,1 capahiliric», t .ak lJ1~ min ~ 1 ~'(,:mlll l to particular the
Alli.mc ·' s role , l·Jp .;.l\.·itic..... and invo lvement in the rCt lt Hi in t. I U ~l- l i {l ll. n' ~1 1 prnl..'c~ ", will be
co nducted thr o ugh Ih l..' " Berli n pl u-," ....nan~ l.: n ll:nt.' .
In o rder tp IlHpro ve the preparat ion 01- Ell ope ra tion .. haVln~ rr cOll hl".· 10 '\l:\T U i' '''M'h a nd
ca pabi lu ic-, under Hcr h n pin ' urrangemcnts. we pr" p" '" rhal :, , ,,,,,I I Fl ' c ell should be c ' lahli, lll'd
~ I l SH ,\PE a nd t o invu e 1"t\TO h I c, r;Jnli:...h l i ;li ~t)n arr~mgt: IfICf1l ... ~ I the ElJ ,\1S . It will al :...o en-ure
full I r~ II'l l-;Jrcn l..") be tween r.t ' and I "AT O t='mhudyj ll~ the ir , U. l ll'g ii.- pau ncrvhip i ll (~ri,i...
II I~n~p..: mc:m .
\\ . ,abo Jllllfl'l)\(' W enhance the l,,'. IP :K'Jly o f the: t_~ l l\ fS I I' ('nnd ll ~' 1 car ty w.um ng, suuanon
;J ....:-..t~ ..... mem ;uul !'- trategi( planninr IhnJugh I h~ evtabfi...hmc nt within Ihe EUt\lS of a ee l] with
L: i\ l l/m ilit ;lC) L" " Il I I Jo lJ~nh . h ......ill i ll part i~u"Ir; -
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